Detection of injection attacks on in-vehicle network using data analytics by Dhulipala, Sri Lalitha Dakshayani
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2018
Detection of injection attacks on in-vehicle
network using data analytics
Sri Lalitha Dakshayani Dhulipala
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dhulipala, Sri Lalitha Dakshayani, "Detection of injection attacks on in-vehicle network using data analytics" (2018). Graduate Theses
and Dissertations. 16804.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/16804
Detection of injection attacks on in-vehicle network using data analytics
by
Sri Lalitha Dakshayani Dhulipala
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Major: Computer Engineering (Computing and Networking Systems)
Program of Study Committee:
Lotfi Ben Othmane, Co-major Professor
Manimaran Govindarasu, Co-major Professor
Doug Jacobson
The student author, whose presentation of the scholarship herein was approved by the program of
study committee, is solely responsible for the content of this thesis. The Graduate College will
ensure this thesis is globally accessible and will not permit alterations after a degree is conferred.
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
2018
Copyright c© Sri Lalitha Dakshayani Dhulipala, 2018. All rights reserved.
ii
DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents Satyanarayana and Padmavathi Dhulipala and
my sister Sarvani without whose support I would not have been able to complete this work.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.5 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Automobile Network Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1 ECUs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 CAN Bus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2.2 Message frame format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 OBD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2 OBD-II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
iv
2.3.3 PIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Attack Surfaces in Automobiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5 Vulnerabilities in CAN network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CHAPTER 3. STATE OF THE ART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1 Automobile Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Attack Prevention Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Attack Detection and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.1 Raspberry Pi 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2.2 PiCAN2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.3 Human Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2.4 Cables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.3 Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.1 SocketCAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3.2 canutils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.4 Target Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.5 Other Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.5.1 Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.5.2 Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.5.3 Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.6 Reverse Engineering CAN packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.6.1 Connecting to the CAN BUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.6.2 Monitoring CAN bus and Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.6.3 Filtering CAN messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
v4.7 Injection attack on CAN network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.7.1 Modifying the files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
CHAPTER 5. DETECTION OF ATTACKS USING DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES . . 28
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2 Detection using Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2.1 Pearson Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2.2 K-Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.3 Detection Using Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3.1 Hidden Markov model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.4 Time Series Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4.1 Simple moving average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4.2 Exponential Moving Average . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1 Data Analysis Techniques - Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1.1 Correlation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6.1.2 Causality Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.1.3 Time series Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6.2 Impacts of the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Table 2.1 OBD-II Pin Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 6.1 Sample Posterior probabilities for normal functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 6.2 Sample Posterior probabilities for RPM attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Figure 2.1 ECUs in an automobile [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 2.2 CAN Bus Frame Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 2.3 OBD pin-out diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 4.1 OBD port in 2005 Nissan Sentra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Figure 4.2 Raspberry PI, PiCAN board connection to OBD-II port . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Figure 4.3 SocketCAN Architecture [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 4.4 ECUsim 2000 simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 4.5 Data stream output of candump command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Figure 4.6 Finding PID using Record-Replay Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 6.1 Speed RPM Correlation Matrix - Normal Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 6.2 RPM attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 6.3 Speed attack scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 6.4 K-Means: RPM attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 6.5 K-Means: Speed attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 6.6 Time-series: RPM attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Figure 6.7 Time-series: Speed attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to those who helped me with various
aspects of conducting research and the writing of this thesis. First and foremost, I thank Dr. Lotfi
Ben Othmane for his guidance, patience and support throughout this research and the writing of
this thesis. His insights and words of encouragement have often inspired me and renewed my hopes
for completing my graduate education. I would also like to thank my committee members for their
efforts and contributions to this work: Dr. Manimaran Govindarasu and Dr. Doug Jacobson. I
would additionally like to thank my team mate Sudharrshan Janarthanan for his help during the
experimentation phase of the project.
I thank Dr. Nicholas Multari, Professor Ashfaq Khokhar, and Professor Bharat Bhargava for
supporting the work financially. My work was mainly funded by the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratories through the Iowa State University Information Assurance Center. Equipment were
funded by the Qatar National Research Fund and The ECpE Department Excellence fund.
ix
ABSTRACT
We investigate the possibility of detection of injection attacks using data analytics techniques
in this thesis. The automotive industry is innovating the modern vehicles towards connectivity by
interfacing them with various external entities. These entities are exposing the automobile to cyber
attacks instead of ensuring its safety. Therefore it is important to consider the security aspect while
developing these interfaces. Firstly, we try understand the automobile network architecture and the
possible security threats associated with it. Next, we examine the various possible cyber-attacks
on automobiles described in the literature. We experiment and analyze the attack scenarios by
performing injection attacks on a vehicle. We collect the data during the injection attacks and
apply multiple data analysis techniques. These techniques build a model based on data during
normal operation. The observations from the data collected during injection attacks is fit into
these techniques. The data points that do not fit the model are termed as attack points. Finally
we examine and analyze the results and their accuracy in detecting injection attacks.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Automobiles have become an integral part of the modern living. The technology has advanced
from animal driven carriages to self-driving autonomous cars. The modern automobile is an increas-
ingly complex network of computer systems. Cars are no longer analog, mechanical contraptions.
Today, even the most fundamental vehicular functions have become computerized.
Modern automobiles connect to external entities and offer access to the in-vehicle network. The
Controlled Area Network or the CAN network is the in- vehicle network which communicates with
the external world through Cellular network, Bluetooth , Wi-Fi etc. Due to the absence of security
mechanisms in the CAN network, the automobile is prone to attacks through these external entities
connected to the system.
An attacker can gain access to the network through any of the above external entities and
replicate messages on the network. The vehicles cannot differentiate between legitimate in-vehicle
messages and malicious ones. The impact of these attacks can vary from harmless honking to fatal
accidents. With the advances in technology moving towards autonomous vehicles, it is important
to secure the automobile network from such attacks. Also the wide spread of tools and knowledge
to perform cyber-attacks on connected vehicles is posing a threat to the safety of the automobile
users.
1.1 Problem
The CAN network implemented in these automobiles has inherent security flaws. It lacks
encryption and device authentication which gives easy access to the intruders. Also, the broadcast
nature of the bus readily provides the data from safety critical systems as well on the network.
The data from theses systems can be monitored, modified and malicious data can also be injected.
2Therefore, it is important to have a mechanism to detect the attacks on the CAN network. Through
this thesis the following question would be addressed:
Can we detect injection attacks on an automobile network ?
1.2 Threat model
Automobiles have several functional units which directly or indirectly provide easy access to
the network. These access points are called attack vectors. A collection of attack vectors is called
as an attack surface. Broadly the attack surfaces can be classified into three categories:
• Direct physical access to CAN
• Over the air - GPS, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, Cellular and Vehicle to Vehicle networks
• ECU - Firmware update
Each of these attack surfaces has multiple attack vectors through which the intruder can inject data
on to the network. The scope of this thesis is limited to the direct physical access. The physical
access is obtained through the OBD - II port.
1.3 Approach
The goal of this project is to detect injection attacks on CAN network by emulating the attack
scenarios applying Data analysis techniques to the attack data and detecting an attack. The attacks
are performed on the tachometer and speedometer but can be replicated to several other units as
well.
To begin with, the CAN data is monitored to examine how the message passing takes places.
Then the data is collected from the tachometer and speedometer. The data is modified and it is
injected onto the network. Then the data is again monitored and recorded during the injection at-
tack. Finally, the data collected during the attack scenario is compared with the normal functioning
data using data analysis techniques to detect an attack situation.
3Five data analysis techniques were applied to the CAN data. They are broadly divided into
three categories:
• Correlation techniques
– Pearson Correlation
– K Means Clustering
• Causality
– Hidden Markov Model
• Time Series Analysis
– Moving Average Technique
1.4 Hardware
All the automobiles manufactured after 2008 must contain CAN bus by federal law. So this
experiment can be replicated on any automobile which contains CAN bus. We have used a 2017
Ford Transit model to perform the experiment. The data collection and injection was performed
with the help of Raspberry Pi3 and Pi CAN 2 modules.
1.5 Organization
This thesis is organized into nine chapters. Chapter 2 is Background which discusses the
architecture of CAN bus. Chapter 3 is Related Work which discusses the previous work in the
literature. Chapter 4 is dedicated to the Experimentation setup and Methodology. The next three
chapter discuss a data analysis technique, how is it applied to our data set and the results obtained.
Chapter 5 discusses the Data Analysis techniques used. Chapter 8 is Discussion of results and the
outcomes. Chapter 9 is the conclusion.
4CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides the fundamental concepts of the CAN network. The automobile network
architecture section describes how various components in an automobile are connected and how
they function in tandem. The second section describes the CAN network architecture. The next
section discusses On-Board Diagnostic standard. The last two sections discuss the limitations of
CAN bus and the attack surfaces in an automobile.
2.1 Automobile Network Architecture
2.1.1 ECUs
The automobile network comprises of multiple dedicated units called as the Electronic Control
Units (ECUs). These units are the nodes connected to the network to enable exchange of data
between them. Since it is physically impossible to connect each unit with every other unit, they are
connected in sub-networks which integrates into a common master network. Each unit broadcasts
the information onto this bus and the unit which needs to respond, receives the information by an
identifier. Some, typical ECUs present in every automobile are
• Transmission Control Unit
• Engine Control Unit
• Brake Control Module
• Speed Control Unit
• Telematics control Unit
• Battery Management system
5Previously, these units were connected using a master-slave network called LIN bus [3]. The
LIN bus was low speed at 20 KBps. It was not fault tolerant. Nowadays, the safety critical systems
like Brake control, engine control etc are connected on a High-Speed bus and LIN bus is being used
for non-critical subsystems in the units like mirror adjustment, window roll down etc.
Figure 2.1 ECUs in an automobile [1]
2.2 CAN Bus
2.2.1 History
CAN or Controlled area network is a networking bus primarily used to communicate between
multiple micro-controllers. It allows embedded devices to communicate with each other without a
host computer. The modern-day automobiles as discussed earlier are not mere mechanical devices,
but a complex system of control units connected by the CAN bus.
Robert Bosch began the development of the CAN bus in 1983. The protocol was officially
released in 1986 at the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) conference in Detroit, Michigan.
CAN bus is one of five protocols used in the on-board diagnostics (OBD)-II vehicle diagnostics
standard. The OBD-II standard has been mandatory for all cars and light trucks sold in the
6United States since 1996. The EOBD standard has been mandatory for all petrol vehicles sold in
the European Union since 2001 and all diesel vehicles since 2004.
2.2.2 Message frame format
A CAN network can be configured to work with two different message formats: the standard
or base frame format, and the extended frame format (described by CAN 2.0 B). These message
formats are also known as frames. The extended format has an 18-bit identifier extension in addition
to the 11-bit identifier field found in the 11- bit format. The frame format for a 11-bit CAN message
is shown in Figure 2.2 below:
Figure 2.2 CAN Bus Frame Format
The CAN arbitration ID is an 11-bit field and the most important field. This ID is used to
identify different devices on the CAN bus and to prioritize messages. These bits allow the attacker
to filter the unwanted packets, replicate and spoof a legitimate packet.
The next important field, the CAN data field, can be 0 to 64 bits (8 bytes) in length. It holds the
bits that direct the unit to perform the function. The functionality of the units can be understood
by sniffing the data and varying the bits on this field.
The above figure is the general data frame. There a four types of frame formats:
• General frame: a frame used to exchange data between the nodes.
• Remote frame: a frame requesting the transmission of a specific identifier
7• Error frame: a frame transmitted by any node detecting an error
• Overload frame: a frame to inject a delay between data or remote frame.
CAN is a multi-master serial bus standard for connecting Electronic Control Units. CAN works
on CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Detection) principle, where a single carrier
is shared among number of ECUs. All nodes (ECUs) are connected to each other through a two-
wire bus. One wire represents the CAN high or CANH and the other is CAN low or CANL. All
nodes are connected to each other through a two wire bus. The two wires have an impedance of
120 ohms.
2.3 OBD
OBD stands for On Board Diagnostics. This is a functionality implemented in the automobiles
which gives them the ability to report malfunctions and self-diagnose the errors. The OBD system
helps the owner/mechanic to understand which unit or subsystem is causing errors. Currently,
several hand-held, plug and play devices are available in the market which can be connected to the
automobile to obtain real time monitoring of several ECUs.
2.3.1 History
The first On Board Computer System appeared in 1968 when Volkswagen’s fuel injected Type-
3 model. Later for almost two decades, several manufacturers implemented OBD without any
standardization. In 1988, SAE introduced a standardized diagnostic port connector and a set of
protocols for OBD. California Air Resources Board (CARB) made it mandatory for all vehicles
sold in California to have some OBD capability. This was OBD - I. In 1994, CARB standardized
the current iteration of OBD, known as OBD-II, and mandated that it be included on all new cars
sold in California. By 1996, OBD-II was mandated nationwide in the United States.
8Figure 2.3 OBD pin-out diagram
2.3.2 OBD-II
The OBD-II standard specifies the type of diagnostic connector and its pin-out, signalling
protocols and the format of messages. It also provides a list of vehicle parameters called Diagnostic
Trouble Codes (DTCs) to monitor and diagnose malfunctions. OBD-II port is a 16-pin port
usually located near the steering wheel. This port gives direct access to the CAN network. The
table 2.1 below provides the pin specification:
Table 2.1 OBD-II Pin Specification
Pin Function Pin Function
1 Manufacture Specific 9 Manufacture Specific
2 J1850 Bus (+) 10 J1850 Bus (-)
3 Manufacturer Specific 11 Manufacturer Specific
4 Ground 12 Manufacturer Specific
5 Ground 13 Manufacturer Specific
6 CAN High 14 CAN Low
7 K-Line (ISO 9141-2) 15 L-Line (ISO 9141-2)
8 Manufacturer Specific 16 12V Battery Power
Out of these 16 pins, pin 6 and pin 14 are the most important. Pin 6 carries CAN High at 3.75 V
and Pin 14 carries CAN Low at 1.25 V. This creates a potential difference of 2.5V which facilitates
the communication. this differential voltage also makes CAN noise tolerant and minimizes the
interference.
92.3.3 PIDs
PID stands for Parameter ID. PIDs are codes sent to the ECUs to request data from the vehicle.
These IDs are predefined and each PID corresponds to a particular unit’s parameter. For example,
in our target vehicle the PID 115 corresponds to tachometer reading and the PID 254 corresponds
to speedometer reading. To obtain the data from a unit, the external hardware sends a query PID
to the network. The network sends the data as a response to the query.
2.4 Attack Surfaces in Automobiles
An attack surface can be defined as the collection of access points or attack vectors through
which an intruder can gain access to the system. In the context of automobile, the attack surfaces
are the points through which the attacker can gain access to the CAN network. Modern day
automobiles have several functional units which directly or indirectly provide easy access to the
network. Broadly they can be classified into three categories:
• Direct access to CAN Direct access is connection to the physical wires of CAN. They can be
obtained by connecting to the OBD II port or through the TPMS (Tire Pressure Monitoring
System) module or by breaking open the infotainment system or other similar units. OBD-II
port is essentially an unprotected backdoor into a vehicles most sensitive embedded systems.
• Over the air CAN network connects to the external environment through various commu-
nication systems. Most of the modern cars are equipped with GPS, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and
Cellular network modules. These units also provide easy access to CAN network.
• ECU - Firmware ECUs in automobiles are like the CPUs of a computer. They contain the
firmware which controls all the subsystems (break control, transmission control, timing control
etc) in the automobile. The ECUs firmware can be compromised as well.
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2.5 Vulnerabilities in CAN network
The CAN network was developed to be a fast and robust way of communication between
different nodes. But it did not include any kind of security features. Due to the inherent flaws
in the implementation of CAN bus, it is easy to break into the network. the following are major
security flaws of the CAN network:
• Lack of Segmentation and Boundary Defense: While the CAN bus utilizes many
different Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to oversee different vehicle functions, all sections
of the bus are connected back to a common ECU at some point. Thus an intruder can gain
access to the Anti-Breaking System through the infotainment system.
• Lack of Device Authentication: All data is available to all other vehicular components
on the CAN bus once it is broadcast onto the bus, irrespective of whether they require that
information or not. Other controllers on the CAN bus constantly listen for specific messages.
However, the system does not have a mechanism to prevent unauthorized devices from joining
the CAN bus and broadcasting messages out to any listening controllers.
• Un-encrypted Traffic: Encryption was never taken into consideration when CAN was being
developed. The goal of CAN was to be fast and robust and implementation of encryption
would bloat CAN messages and clog the bus.
• Availability Check: The CAN network checks for the availability of the carrier before every
message is sent. If the carrier is busy, all the ECUs are halted for a while and the carrier is
rechecked. This mechanism can be used by attackers to carryout Denial Of Service attacks by
flooding the bus with High priority messages from critical units thus blocking the less critical
ECUs from sending their messages.
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CHAPTER 3. STATE OF THE ART
This chapter describes the existing research in the field of automobile security. The first sec-
tion describes the exploits performed on CAN bus. There are two ways to address this security
issue. The first method is through prevention of attacks and the second method is to identify the
attack scenario and mitigate the damage. Second section describes the previously developed attack
prevention techniques and the next section describes the attack detection and mitigation scenarios.
3.1 Automobile Attacks
Early research by Wolf et.al [4] identified the potential threats when the ECUs were being in-
terfaced with systems like bluetooth, GSM, GPS modules to receive updates. They have identified
the importance of automotive security. Zhao [5] identified the potential attack vector in an auto-
mobile system as the automotive technology rapidly advances towards V2V and V2I connectivity.
Being a crucial part of this connected ecosystem, it is important to secure automobiles to facilitate
safe and efficient travel. Though there were several publications in the academia [6] [7], the first
experimental proof was demonstrates by Koscher et. al [8]. They demonstrated several attacks like
unlocking doors, controlling the lights, horn, wipers etc. They achieved these attacks my fuzzing
the and reprogramming the ECUs.
Hoppe and others [9] demonstrated attacks on airbag control, gateway ECU and electric window
lift. A team of researchers from University of Washington and University of California, San Diego
[10] experimented with a plethora of attack vectors including CD players, Bluetooth, radio etc.
But the attack that caught the world’s eye was the Jeep Cherokee attack at 2013 DEF CON [11]
demonstrated By Chris Valesek and Charlie Miller. They have successfully taken over the vehicles
control remotely by accessing the vehicle’s steering, brakes and transmission through a vulnerability
in the infotainment system through Sprint Cellular network. They could maneuver the car into
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a ditch by disabling the brakes. They previously demonstrated several attacks by altering the
firmware on Toyota Prius and Ford Escape.
The famous Chrysler hack was also due to a vulnerability in the UConnect system [12]. In 2016,
a group of researchers from Keen Security labs [13] took over both the infotainment and instrument
cluster screens and remotely unlock the doors of Tesla X. They were also able to open the trunk,
fold a side mirror, and activate the brakes while the vehicle was in motion. Researchers were also
able to remotely open the sunroof, move the power seats, and activate the signal lamps.
3.2 Attack Prevention Methods
Attack prevention methods essentially require the architecture to be more secure. Several
authentication protocols were proposed on top of the existing CAN which will provide an additional
layer of security.
• CAN Auth: Attack prevention methods essentially require the architecture to be more
secure. Several authentication protocols were proposed on top of the existing CAN which
will provide an additional layer of security. Herrewege et al. [14] proposed CAN Auth which
requires a pre-shared key and the authentication data is transmitted out of band providing
15 bytes for authentication It successfully prevent replay attacks with the help of a counter
value. This protocol is compatible with the existing CAN protocol.
• LCAP: LCAP stands for Light Weight CAN Authentication Protocol. This was proposed
by Hazen and Fahmy [15] A magic number is generated using a one-way hash function. This
magic number would be selected by the sender and only the intended receiver van verify it.
This protocol reduced the communication and computational complexity that usually comes
with cryptography. However, the predefined key and the session keys are exchanged between
each sender and each receiver to initiate the protocol.
• LiBrA CAN: LiBrA CAN stands for Light weight Broadcast Authentication CAN proto-
col. This is similar to LCAP which exchange a pair of keys between the sender and receiver.
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However instead of assigning a key to every sensor or ECU, they assigned keys by group-
ing theses devices. They proposed a master oriented authentication scheme, Multi-master
oriented authentication scheme and a Distributed authentication scheme.
However, all the above protocols can not be implemented through over the air updates. They
need to be implemented by physically accessing the ECUs. Except CANAuth which is backward
compatible, these protocols cannot work hand in hand with the existing CAN protocol architecture.
3.3 Attack Detection and Mitigation
The Attack detection and Mitigation strategy requires replication of attacks and then applying
a detection methodology which would detect anomalous behavior. The detection algorithm would
either correct the attack or alert the driver that the vehicle is under attack. Some of the detection
and mitigation strategies are:
• Sensor based detection: Muter et, al. [16] proposed anomaly detection using sensors.
These sensors are designed based on the network protocol specifications, redundant data
sources in the vehicles and the defined cooperative networking behavior of the devices. They
do not produce false positives. Since they are based on unambiguous and reliable information.
Limitation: There is a high possibility of false negatives in this case. The errors caused by
hardware will also be classified under attack.Also, the source of anomaly cannot be detected
(hardware error or malicious attack) using sensors. Moreover, the attacks caused by messages
that are fully compliant to the networks normal behavior will be left undetected.
• Entropy based detection: Muter et, al. [17] also proposed an anomaly detection technique
based on the entropy of the CAN messages. This technique relies on a parameter called as
Coincidence. Coincidence factor is calculated by examining the relative entropy between two
data sets. One data is collected when there is no attack. The second set is real time data.
Generally, the legitimate data had lower coincidence factor value than under attack. When
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the bus is flooded with a similar type of messages, the entropy decreases and the coincidence
factor grows steadily. This steady growth is used to detect the anomalous behavior.
Limitation: It is hard to determine the threshold of the coincidence after which the scenario
will be termed as an attack. The attacks where the attacked value has very small deviation
from the legitimate value on the bus would go unnoticed. Since both the values would give
the same value of coincidence factor.
• Artificial Injection This is another commonly used technique for detection. In this tech-
nique, the legitimate data is collected from the automobile. Then, instead of replicating the
attack on the vehicle, the malicious data is inserted randomly into the legitimate data set
and a detection algorithm is applied. This technique is simpler and doesn’t have the hassle
of finding the right hardware for attacks. Also, the automobile is not at risk.
Limitation: Although this is a simpler method to inject data, this method is not reliable.
Artificial injection doesn’t account for the response and feedback from the automobile. During
an injection attack, the frequency at which the malicious messages to be broadcast on the
bus is of a great significance. The response also depends on the target vehicle. In reality,
automobile can ignore malicious messages as stray messages if the frequency is too low. At
the same time, the systems can be bricked if the the flooding frequency is too high. So these
factors are crucial while deciding a mitigation strategy.
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CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the experimental setup required to perform injection attacks on the
automobile. The hardware section describes various boards which can be used to interface with
CAN network. The Software section describes the packages used for packet sniffing and injection
on to the CAN network. This chapter also includes other boards and which can be used replicate
the attacks.
4.2 Hardware
The attack surface selected in this project is the OBD-II port. The OBD-II port is usually
located under the steering wheel of the automobile. It is requires to be within 2 feet (0.61 m) of
the steering wheel. (Some exceptions might exist but it would still be in the reach of the driver).
This port give direct physical access to the CAN network. We use a CAN to USB cable to connect
to a computer.
4.2.1 Raspberry Pi 3
Raspberry is a fully functional computer built on a single circuit board. Raspberry Pi 3 fea-
tures a 64 bit ARM Cortex A53 quad core processor and 1GB RAM. It runs Raspbian, a Debian
Based Linux operating system. It also has on-board Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and USB boot capabilities.
Raspberry Pi 3 by itself is insufficient to communicate with the CAN network. In combination
with a CAN controller, it can communicate with the automobile network. We achieve the ability
to communicate with CAN by interfacing Raspberry Pi 3 with PiCAN 2 board.
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Figure 4.1 OBD port in 2005 Nissan Sentra
4.2.2 PiCAN2
PiCAN board provides CAN communication capabilities when mounted on the Raspberry Pi. It
contains MCP2515 CAN controller in combination with MCP2551 CAN transceiver. The controller
fulfills the communication functions prescribed by the CAN protocol. The transceiver connects the
CAN controller to the physical transmission medium. In this case it connects to the CAN H and
CAN L pins. PiCAN connects to the CAN network through a DB-9 connector. It can also be
accessed through a 3 way screw terminal. It supports the Socket CAN driver which is discussed in
Section 4.3.1.
4.2.3 Human Interface
A laptop is necessary to sniff the packets and to associate the PID (Parameter ID) with the
corresponding ECU. A MacBook Pro was used in this experiment. It contains a 2.5GHz Core i5
Intel processor with 4 GB RAM and 500 GB storage. Any laptop with an Ethernet and USB ports
is be sufficient. The laptop is used only for graphical interface to view the stream of packets. All
the computation and processing are performed on the Raspberry Pi. Alternatively, a Linux system
with Ubuntu OS or a Linux VM can be used with a CAN to USB interface like CANtact.
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Figure 4.2 Raspberry PI, PiCAN board connection to OBD-II port
4.2.4 Cables
4.2.4.1 OBD to DB9
The PiCAN does not have an OBD port, instead it has a DB9 serial port. Therefore, an OBD
to DB9 cable is required. This cable simply puts the CAN H signal (OBD-II pin 6) onto DB9 pin
3, and the CAN L signal (OBD-II pin 14) onto DB9 pin 5. This can be obtained from Spark fun.
4.2.4.2 USB Cable
The USB cable connects the Raspberry Pi to the laptop. This is primarily used to power the
board from the laptop. We could use a power cable as well.
4.2.4.3 Ethernet Cable
The Ethernet cable connects between Raspberry Pi and the laptop. This facilitates the network
between the Raspberry Pi and the laptop through VNC viewer.
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Figure 4.3 SocketCAN Architecture [2]
4.3 Software
4.3.1 SocketCAN
SocketCAN [18] is an open source Linux driver package specially designed by Volkswagen Re-
search. It ties into the Linux networking stack. It supports built-in CAN chips, external USBs,
Serial and Virtual CAN devices. SocketCAN applications can use standard C socket calls with
a custom network protocol family, PF-CAN. This functionality allows the kernel to handle CAN
device drivers and to interface with existing networking hardware to provide a common interface
and user-space utilities. By creating its own CAN protocol family, SocketCAN can integrate with
the existing network device drivers, thus enabling applications to treat a CAN bus interface as if
its a generic network interface.
4.3.2 canutils
The can-utils package provides several applications and tools to interact with the CAN network
devices, CAN-specific protocols, and the ability to set up a virtual CAN environment. These array
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of tools and utilities can be used to sniff the CAN network, read and send packets onto the CAN
network. It is available for free on Git-Hub [19].
• candump
This command dumps all the CAN packets on the network to the console. The user can set
flags in order to filter out the unwanted packets. It can also be used to log the packets into
a file. This functionality is very useful in reverse engineering the CAN packets by replaying
them from log files. The command is given along with the network name (can0).
Usage: candump can0
• canplayer
This command replays the CAN log files that are stored using the candump command. The
.log file can be replayed by using the following command:
Usage: canplayer -i speed.log –I is a flag which specifies the recorded log file (speed.log) to
be played infinitely till the user stops.
• cansniffer
This command displays the CAN packets and also highlights the bits which vary with time.
This functionality can be used to identify repetitive packets and filter out the unwanted
packets. Thus displaying the packets which change in real time.
Usage: cansniffer can0
• cansend
This command is sends a message on the CAN network. If used repeatedly, this command
floods the bus with messages.
Usage: cansend can0 115#4E0001FF0000FFFF In the above command, can0 is the name
of the network, the digits before the pound sign (115) correspond to the PID and the digits
after the pound sign correspond to the data.
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4.4 Target Vehicle
he target vehicle is a 2017 model Ford Transit 500. We have tested several vehicles including
Toyota Corolla, Chevrolet Sonic, Hyundai Veloster. But only Ford Transit delivered reliable results.
The other vehicles gave erratic output. This was because the way each network is designed is
manufacturer specific. The scope of this project is limited to only Ford Transit.
4.5 Other Methods
We experimented with several boards before finalizing the Raspberry Pi 3, PiCAN with Socket
CAN. They are listed below:
4.5.1 Hardware
• ELM327 chipset is similar to MCP2515 and the cheapest available chipset. It has the ability
to communicate with OBD over serial connections like USB, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. However,
it is primarily used for diagnostics and cannot interface with Socket CAN or CAN utils.
• Arduino also has the capability to communicate with CAN when a CAN interfaced with a
CAN shield. Regardless of the shield, Arduino scripts have to be written in order to sniff/play
the packets. It also requires another SD card shield to store the logs.
• Sparkfun OBD-II UART hosts STN1110 an OBD to UART interpreter. This board has
both ELM327 as well as MCP 2515. It can be used to access both CAN and OBD protocols.
The limitations of this device is that it needs an addition FTDI interface / an Arduino board
to perform injection. Additionally, the pins need to be soldered.
• There are also several testers available in the market which are used by mechanics to deter-
mine the faults in the automobiles. The testers rely on Diagnostic trouble codes or DTCs.
They are powerful in monitoring the traffic and analyzing the traffic. However their func-
tionality is limited to sniffing the packets. The user cannot send packets on to the bus
continuously.
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4.5.2 Software
• Wireshark is a network sniffing tool. It can be run like can-utils on Linux with Socket CAN
to log the data. However, Wiresharks decoder handles only the basic CAN header and doesnt
know how to deal with ISO-TP or UDS packets.
• Kayak is a Java based GUI for analyzing CAN traffic. It has very advanced features like
record and replay, GPS tracking etc. It needs a Linux interface and hence operates over
SocketCAN.
• Caring Caribou is a security scanner for automobiles. It is still under development and very
nascent. It can be used to brute force diagnostic services.
4.5.3 Simulator
• We also used ECUsim 2000, depicted in figure 4.4 which is an OBD-II simulator from Scan
Tool OBD solutions. Although it cannot be used for injection attacks, it is useful in studying
the working of an ECU. It can generate faults and MIL lights, and it also includes fault knobs
for changing common vehicle parameters, such as speed.
4.6 Reverse Engineering CAN packets
4.6.1 Connecting to the CAN BUS
The Raspberry Pi connects to PiCAN circuit as shown in 4.2. This can be done by plugging the
hardware into the OBD II port. Canutils can be cloned from GitHub and must be pre-installed
on the Raspberry Pi. Once the hardware is in place, the network can be set by the following
commands:
sudo ip link set can0 type can bitrate 500000
sudo ip link set up can0
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Figure 4.4 ECUsim 2000 simulator
4.6.2 Monitoring CAN bus and Data collection
The first step is to monitor the traffic and record the packets. A similar stream of packets like
the following 4.5 can be observed on the console upon issuing candump command.
candump can0
4.6.3 Filtering CAN messages
CAN message filtering can be achieved using cansniffer command as discussed previously. Only
the messages whose value changes in real time are displayed and all the static packets are filtered
out. This can be efficiently used to identify the PID that needs to be flooded. Once there are a
small number of active PIDs, the record-replay technique can be used. However, this technique
has a disadvantage. The PIDs which act as counters/time-keepers will appear along with the PID
corresponding to the action as well.
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Figure 4.5 Data stream output of candump command
The second method to reverse engineer the PIDs is using record and replay technique. For
example, to find out the PID corresponding to the tachometer reading (Engine RPM), the candump
command is given. Once the logging begins, the engine RPM is increased to a certain value say,
3000 rpm. Then the recorded log file is played back to check if the meter reading changes. Now the
recording is divided into half and the first half is played. If the meter reading changes, the PID is
in the first half. Else, it is present in the second half of the recording. This process of elimination
is further continued till a single PID is achieved. The following flowchart 4.6 represents the steps
required to reverse engineer the PIDs.
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Figure 4.6 Finding PID using Record-Replay Technique
Using the above process of elimination, the PID for tachometer (RPM reading) is found to be
115 and speedometer reading is found to be 154.
4.7 Injection attack on CAN network
The goal of the experiment is not just monitoring the CAN network but also injecting packets
onto the network. This can be achieved by performing similar steps performed to single down the
PID. The attack part is simple and can be done via any one of the attack surfaces discussed earlier.
The easiest and the most accessible is through the OBD port.
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4.7.1 Modifying the files
The first step in injection attacks is to modify the log files. A sample line from the log file is
given below. The first column is the time stamp in milliseconds, second column is the name of the
CAN network (named as can0 in this case). The three digits before the pound sign (115 - RPM)
represent the PID and the digits following the pound sign are the CAN message data bits. All of
them are hexadecimal.
(1524351875.676969) can0 115#4E0001FF00000145
Out of the 16 digits, not all of them are responsible for the change in the RPM. The easiest
way to determine the digits is by selecting two digits at a time and making them 00 (minimum) or
FF (maximum) and sending them using cansend. In our case, the last four digits determined the
value on the tachometer as well as the speedometer. The injected RPM value is ’FFFF’ which in
decimal translates to 16,384.
Eg: cansend can0 115#4E0001FF0000FFFF
This command needs to be sent continuously on to the network to observe a noticeable change
in the meter reading (since the message rate is in the order of milliseconds). A Python script can
loop cansend command at the required frequency. Alternatively, the log file can be altered and
customized as well. The data packets can be altered simply by replacing all the packets which
belong to a certain PID to a fixed value. This altered log file can be replayed using canplayer
command. This will give the same result as looping cansend command.
When running canplayer, the -v option (verbose) displays each line of the .log file on the screen
in real time, as it is being played back. The -I option is used to specify the filename of the input
file. The CAN .log file can either be played back to the vehicle while the engine is running or while
the engine is off (as long as the ignition is in the ON position). Regardless of whether the vehicle
is parked or is in motion, it is still possible to take control of the CAN bus.
canplayer -I filename.log
The log file should be of the same format as the original. One interesting aspect of the log files
is the timestamp. There is no mechanism in the automobile which checks if the time stamp is valid
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or not. The time stamp represents the number of seconds elapsed since January 1, 1970 till now.
However, the interval at which the time increments one line to next is important.
4.7.1.1 Data pre-processing
The data on the CAN bus is hexadecimal and is a mixture of data from all the units. So the
first step is to filter RPM data out from the total CAN data and convert it into decimal value. As
discussed earlier, only the last four digits in the data are responsible for the display on the meters.
• RPM pre-processing
The RPM values when converted from hexadecimal to decimal vary between 0 to 65,535 (0
to FFFF). But the actual value of RPM varies from 0 to 16,383.75. The conversion can be
calculated using the following formula:
rpmactual =
(rpmdec) ∗ 256
1000
(4.1)
where rpmdec is the decimal equivalent of the last four hexadecimal digits in the data field
and rpmactual is the actual tachometer value.
The same procedure and formula applies to the speed values as well.
• Speed pre-processing
The Speed values when converted from hexadecimal to decimal vary between 0 to 65,535 (0
to FFFF). The ECUs read the values in kilometers per hour (kmph) and the displays in the
US show miles per hour (mph). So we multiply the decimal value with 0.62137119 to obtain
the values in mph. Experiments showed that the resulting value’s decimal point was off by
two digits. Therefore, the obtained value is divided by 100 to calculate the approximate value
of speed. The formula for calculation is shown below:
speedactual =
(speeddec) ∗ 0.62137119
100
(4.2)
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where speeddec is the decimal equivalent of the last four hexadecimal digits in the data field
and speedactual is the actual speedometer value.
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CHAPTER 5. DETECTION OF ATTACKS USING DATA ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUES
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will discuss the various data analysis techniques based on correlation applied on
the CAN data to detect an attack scenario. The techniques are categorized into three sets of
methods based on the approach. The first two methods are based correlation metric between the
data points. The second technique is based on the Causality. The last two methods are based on
Time-Series analysis of data.
5.2 Detection using Correlation
Correlation coefficients are used in statistics to measure how strong a relationship is between
two variables. Pearson Correlation and K Means clustering were used in this category. Pearsons
correlation (also called Pearsons R) is a correlation coefficient commonly used in linear regres-
sion. K Means is a clustering technique which groups data points based on the euclidean distance
correlation.
5.2.1 Pearson Correlation
Pearson Correlation is a method to quantify how two variables are linearly related. The full
name is the Pearson Product Moment Correlation (PPMC). It shows the linear relationship between
two sets of data. Two letters are used to represent the Pearson correlation: Greek letter rho () for
a population and the letter r for a sample.
ρ =
n(
∑
xy)− (∑x)(∑ y)√
[n
∑
x2 − (∑x)2][n∑ y2 − (∑ y)2] (5.1)
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Correlation coefficient formulas are used to find how strong a relationship is between data. The
value of the coefficient can be between -1 and +1.
• +1 indicates a strong positive relationship.
• -1 indicates a strong negative relationship.
• A result of zero indicates no relationship at all.
5.2.1.1 Approach
The speed and engine RPM are directly related. The engine RPM increases as we accelerate the
vehicle. It decreases when we break or stop accelerating. So, engine RPM cannot increase on its
own beyond a small threshold (when the vehicle is powered on). At the same time, the speed cannot
be dropping if the engine RPM is increasing. So, the tachometer as well as the speedometer values
increase when gas is applied. Therefore the speed and RPM values must show a strong positive
correlation. But when data packets are injected to alter the values of the units, this relationship
no longer exists. Therefore their correlation value under attack would be smaller than the previous
case. The value of correlation will determine the attack scenario
• A correlation coefficient of 1 means that for every positive increase in one variable, there is a
positive increase of a fixed proportion in the other.
• A correlation coefficient of -1 means that for every positive increase in one variable, there is
a negative decrease of a fixed proportion in the other.
• Zero means that for every increase, there is no positive or negative increase. The variables
are not related.
• The absolute value of the correlation coefficient gives us the relationship strength. The
larger the number, the stronger the relationship. For example, 0.75, which has a stronger
relationship than 0.65.
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5.2.2 K-Means
K-means clustering is an algorithm of classification for unsupervised learning, for unlabelled
data (i.e., data without defined categories or groups). The goal of this algorithm is to find groups
of data points that are related in the data. The variable K represents the number of groups. Data
points are clustered based on feature similarity. The results of the K-means clustering algorithm
are:
• The centroids of the K clusters, which can be used to label new data
• Labels for the training data (each data point is assigned to a single cluster)
The algorithm works iteratively to assign each data point to one of K groups based on the
features that are provided. Rather than defining groups before looking at the data, clustering
allows to find and analyze the groups that have formed organically. Each centroid of a cluster is
a collection of feature values which define the resulting groups. Examining the centroid feature
weights can be used to qualitatively interpret what kind of group each cluster represents.
5.2.2.1 Algorithm
The -means clustering algorithm uses iterative refinement to produce a final result. The algo-
rithm inputs are the number of clusters and the data set. The data set is a collection of features for
each data point. The algorithms starts with initial estimates for the centroids, which can either be
randomly generated or randomly selected from the data set. The algorithm then iterates between
two steps:
• Data assignment:
In this step, each data point is assigned to its nearest centroid, based on the squared Euclidean
distance. Each centroid defines one of the clusters. More formally, if ci is the collection of
centroids in set C, then each data point x is assigned to a cluster based on
arg min
ci∈C
dist(ci, xi)
2 (5.2)
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where dist( . ) is the standard L2 Euclidean distance. Hence the new centroid is selected by
minimizing the euclidean distance between a data point and its centroid. Let the set of data
point assignments for each ith cluster centroid be Si.
• Centroid update:
In this step, the centroids are updated. The new centroid is calculated by the mean of all
data points assigned to that centroid’s cluster.
ci =
1
|Si|
∑
xi∈Si
xi (5.3)
The algorithm iterates until no data points change clusters and the sum of the distances is
minimized if run indefinitely. Or the maximum number of iterations can be assigned to stop
it.
5.2.2.2 Parameter K
The algorithm described above finds the clusters and data set labels for a particular pre-chosen
K. To find the number of clusters in the data, the user needs to run the K-means clustering algorithm
for a range of K values and compare the results. In general, there is no method for determining
exact value of K, but an accurate estimate can be obtained using the following techniques.
Monitoring the distribution of data points across groups provides insight into how the algorithm
is splitting the data for each K. This method would be used in our approach. One of the metrics
that is commonly used to compare results across different values of K is the mean distance between
data points and their cluster centroid. Since increasing the number of clusters will always reduce
the distance to data points, increasing K will always decrease this metric, to the extreme of reaching
zero when K is the same as the number of data points. Thus, this metric cannot be used as the
sole target. Instead, mean distance to the centroid as a function of K is plotted and the ”elbow
point,” where the rate of decrease sharply shifts, can be used to roughly determine K. Various other
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techniques exist for validating K, including cross-validation, information criteria, the information
theoretic jump method etc.
5.2.2.3 Approach
The CAN data is unlabelled data. There is no difference between the data already on the bus
and the data that is externally injected. There are many algorithms like nearest neighbours and
support vector machines which can classify data into groups. But most of these algorithms need
to be trained by manually labelling a part of the data as ’attack’ or ’normal’. But, K - Means
algorithm can classify unlabelled data. This method is called unsupervised learning.
Essentially, the data needs to be classified into two classes as either ’attack’ or ’normal’ . The
algorithm is applied on tachometer and the speedometer data individually. Since the there are two
classes, the value of the parameter k is set to be 2. This algorithm is guaranteed to converge to
a result. The algorithm sometimes gives the local optimum centroid instead of the best possible
outcome. Therefore, the algorithm is rum multiple times to obtain the best possible outcome.
5.3 Detection Using Causality
This section discusses the second category of Data Analysis techniques, the Causality techniques.
Hidden Markov Model is the data analytics method selected for this analysis. In the previous
section, the anomalous state was detected using the correlation between data points. Correlation
technique cannot determine the source of the anomaly. Causality technique, in particular Hidden
Markov Model can determine the source of the anomaly.
5.3.1 Hidden Markov model
Hidden Markov model(HMM) is a statistical method to model Time series data. It is based
on the Markov property i.e, the probability distribution of future states will depend only upon
the present state and not the events preceding it. In HMM, a sequence of emissions are observed
but the sequence of states the model went through are unknown sequence of states. Each of these
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hidden states will be associated with a set of observations. To create a HMM model, we generate
two set of probabilities, Transition probabilities and Emission probabilities.
• Transition probability Transition probability controls how a new state, lets say S(t), is
chosen from a current state S(t-1).
• Emission probability Emission probability is probability that a specific set of observations
will be generated given current hidden state S(t).
During model generation we try to estimate these probabilities using the given data set. The
different problems solved using HMM models include the following. Given the model, what is the
probability of an observation sequence, what is the most likely sequence of hidden states correspond-
ing to an observation sequence and the model that maximizes the probability of an observation.
5.3.1.1 Approach
We consider the change in vehicle’s parameters as a series of states. For example, the vehicle
is at rest and its speed is zero. Gradually, the speed uniformly increases to 25 miles per hour in 5
seconds. In this scenario, each 5mph increment per second is a state. Therefore, state S1 is speed
0 mph, S2 is speed 5 mph, S3 is speed 10 mph, S4 is 15 mph, S5 is 20 mph and s6 is 25 mph.
Now, if the next state S7 is 150 mph, probability of going to this new state is small. Hence this
state can be termed unusual state. By comparing the probability of the new unusual state with
the probability of previous state we detect anomalous behavior.
Using the above hypothesis as the foundation, our approach to detect injection attack using
HMM has three main steps:
• Model Generation
• Training the model
• Anomaly Detection
34
5.3.1.2 Model Generation
We generate the model based on a sequence of observations. The observations are the RPM
and speed values. We generate the models separately for RPM and speed. So each RPM or speed
value is an observation. We used HMM tool box from MATLAB which has many built-in functions
which help in generating the HMM model. We have used the following functions:
• hmmestimate This function estimates the transition and emission probabilities for a given
set of observations. We used this function to generate transition and emission probabilities.
• hmmviterbi This function is based on Viterbi algorithm. It generates the most probable
path or transition of states given a set of states and their emission and transition probabilities.
• hmmtrain This function calculates the maximum likelihood estimate for emission and tran-
sition probabilities.
We first calculated the transition and emission probabilities using hmestimate. If the data is too
sparse, a speed or RPM gradient should be used instead of actual values to avoid false positives.
5.3.1.3 Training the model
The model can be trained using the function hmmtrain. This function takes observations,
transition and emission probabilities as inputs. By default, the function uses Baum Welch algorithm
to train the model. The algorithm can be changed to Viterbi algorithm as well. We have used
Baum Welch algorithm.
5.3.1.4 Anomaly Detection
We use conditional probability, also called as posterior probability do detect anomalous states in
the sequence. We use sliding window technique to detect anomalies. The sliding window moves with
addition of each new state. The posterior probability of the sequence in the window is determined.
This will result in a set of probabilities for each observation. These probabilities are compared to
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a threshold value. When the posterior probability exceeds the threshold, an anomaly is detected.
We used hmmdecode to perform anomaly detection.
5.4 Time Series Analysis
CAN data is time varying data. The data points are not random. Rather they are recorded at
consecutive intervals of time. This kind of data is called as Time Series data. The data analysis
techniques which are used to estimate the trends in a time-series dataset are called time-series anal-
ysis techniques. Time series analysis is predominantly used in financial institutions for forecasting
purposes. This section will discuss the Moving averages method applied on the CAN data.
5.4.1 Simple moving average
Moving averages are calculated by creating windows or subsets in the complete data set. The
window size is pre-fixed which will be decided based on a certain threshold. The average value
of the data points in the subset is calculated and attributed to the first element in the data set.
The window is shifted forward by an element and the average of the data points in that subset is
calculated again and attributed to the second point. This process is continued till the end of the
data set.
Y SM =
X1 +X2 + ...+XN−1 +XN
N
(5.4)
where,
• YSM is the new data point
• X1 to XN are the values in the window
• N is the number of periods or the window size
The above formula gives the new or forecasted value using simple moving average. This method
takes the unweighted mean of the data points.
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5.4.2 Exponential Moving Average
Exponential moving average is a weighted moving average algorithm. It assigns exponential
weights to the elements to compute the new value. Exponential moving average assigns higher
weights to recent values than the past values. Hence it is more sensitive to the changes in the
values.
St =

Y1, t = 1
α · Yt + (1− α) · St−1 t > 1
(5.5)
where,
• St represents the value of the exponential moving average at time t.
• α represents the smoothing factor. This will decide the extent to which the weights decrease
over time.
• Yt is the actual value at time t.
The smoothing factor is related to the window size ’w’ as shown below:
α =
2
W + 1
(5.6)
5.4.2.1 Approach
The CAN data is a time series data. This data will consists of some irregularities. For example,
the speed values cannot increment linearly. There could be minor peaks which are not due to
injection. In this case, the model must not predict those peaks as attack values. At this point
the moving average method can be used to detect attacks on automobile network. Moving average
smoothens the curve. We can adjust the window size to match the required smoothness. This is
the required threshold. An attack can be identified by looking at the values which are do not fall
in the threshold range. They are represented by the spikes or sudden jumps in the values.
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CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter discusses results, the merits and demerits of each of data analytics techniques
discussed in the previous three chapters and the impacts of the injection attacks on the host
vehicle.
6.1 Data Analysis Techniques - Results
6.1.1 Correlation Techniques
6.1.1.1 Pearson Correlation - Results
6.1.1.2 Result
Initially, Pearson correlation was applied to the legitimate tachometer and the speedometer data
to check whether they were related. The normal CAN data showed a high correlation coefficient
value6.1 of 0.86. Which meant that the rpm values increased as the speed increased. The figure
depicts a correlation matrix where var1 is the speed and var2 is RPM.
When the correlation was applied to the attack data, it showed zero value for speed as shown
in Figure 6.3. Similarly, the value of correlation when the RPM was injected is -0.06 as shown in
the Figure 6.2.
As discussed earlier, zero value means that the two variables are unrelated. The correlation
value can be an initial parameter to determine if there is an attack. The results show that this
could also be used to detect the correlation between the normal functioning and the attack scenario.
Whenever the correlation value drops to a near zero value, it means that there is an anomaly in
the data. Although we cannot determine the cause of the anomaly, we can detect the change in
the behaviour.
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Figure 6.1 Speed RPM Correlation Matrix - Normal Scenario
Figure 6.2 RPM attack scenario Figure 6.3 Speed attack scenario
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The Pearson correlation coefficient is the most simple way to detect unusual behavior in speed
and RPM data. This method can be used as the first line of several detection mechanisms in the
vehicle. The accelerator is responsible for the change in the speed engine as well as RPM of the
vehicle. At any given point of time, these two parameters must exhibit a strong correlation. Pear-
son correlation coefficient detects unusual behavior in the tachometer and speedometer readings.
However, this method is only partially successful in detecting an attack scenario. The coefficient
will show no correlation even if one of the units fail or malfunction. Therefore hardware malfunction
cannot be differentiated from an attack.
6.1.1.3 K Means - Results
Figure 6.4 is the result of clustering the tachometer - RPM attack data. The X and Y axes
represent the time and RPM values respectively. The blue line is the attack values and the red line
represents the legitimate data on the bus. The grey points on both the lines are the cluster centers.
The accuracy of classification on RPM tachometer data is 86.6%. It can be noticed that both the
clusters are far apart and almost look like parallel lines. The injected RPM value is ’FFFF’ which in
decimal translates to 16,384. The legitimate values are around 1000 to 2000. Hence the variations
in the RPM are not visible due the the large variation between attack and normal values.
Figure 6.5 is the result of clustering the speedometer attack data. The X and Y axes represent
the time and speed values respectively. The red line is the attack values and the blue line represents
the legitimate data on the bus. The grey points on both the lines are the cluster centers. The
algorithm when applied on the speedometer data gave an average accuracy of about 87.9%. The
injected value of speed was FFFF and the vehicle speed at the maximum point was around 20 mph.
But we have observed during the experiment that any value above 4B70 (Hex equivalent of 120
mph, the max speed) is treated as 4B70. Hence, in comparison with RPM, the difference between
attack value and normal values of speed is much lesser.
The accuracy of clustering can be increased by increasing the number of clusters. For example,
at k = 100, the algorithm gave was 96% accurate. However, the number of clusters in this case
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Figure 6.4 K-Means: RPM attack Figure 6.5 K-Means: Speed attack
is fixed at 2. Therefore, the data would over-fit if the number of clusters is increased. There are
other methods like k-means++ which can be used to optimize the result.
Similar to Pearson Correlation, K Means can also detect anomalous behavior. We have achieved
an accuracy of 87% on an average. The accuracy can be improved by implementing various opti-
mization techniques. K means ++ will give better clustering accuracy. The results show that the
model is successful in detecting a constant injected value. Further the experiment must be repeated
several times with a range of random injected values to devise a reliable model. This scenario will
be quite closer to an actual attack scenario.
6.1.2 Causality Techniques
6.1.2.1 Hidden Markov Model - Results
The Hidden Markov Model successfully predicts the anomalous states in the CAN data. We
found five kinds of observations in the RPM and speed data. The observations are:
• Gradual increase
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• Gradual decrease
• Constant value
• Sudden increase
• Sudden decrease
Out of the five cases, the first three cases were classified as normal behavior and the last two were
abnormal behavior. Table 6.1 depicts the posterior probabilities. Table 6.2 depicts the posterior
probabilities under tachometer attack. We can observe a profound difference between the normal
and attack probabilities. These extreme values of probabilities (0 and 1) are used to differentiate
attack from normal behavior. The extreme values are caused by the sudden increase or sudden
decrease in the RPM value. The model could differentiate between a gradual increase caused by
natural driving conditions and the sudden increase caused by the attack.
Table 6.1 Sample Posterior probabilities for normal functioning
0.38493275 0.243745946 0.260995802 0.340430998 0.309478055 0.309868661
0.409115024 0.525114533 0.480015556 0.490378124 0.51006003 0.500813405
0.199940304 0.229978461 0.25750628 0.166326769 0.177539471 0.186297938
Table 6.2 Sample Posterior probabilities for RPM attack
0 0.04462013 0 0 0 0.102719277
0.174251212 0.06227673 1 1 0.255753217 0.083630311
0 0.069276806 0 0 0 0.076115937
The HMM is generated by examining the probabilities of transitions between a series of states.
The conditional probabilities of state transition helps differentiate between normal data and anoma-
lous data. This model calculates the likelihood of speed or RPM to drop or increase drastically
based on previous outcomes.
In this project, HMM was applied separately to speed and RPM sensors. It was successful in
detecting the attack values. Further, this model can be applied to multiple observations simulta-
neously. For example, speed is correlated to RPM. Both of them could be under attack. In that
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Figure 6.6 Time-series: RPM attack Figure 6.7 Time-series: Speed attack
scenario, both of them will have erratic peaks and falls. Along with these anomalous states, they
will not have a positive correlation. HMM can be implemented on these multiple observations as
well to detect injection attacks.
6.1.3 Time series Analysis
6.1.3.1 Moving Averages - Results
Figure 6.6 is the output of time series analysis on RPM attack data and figure 6.7 is the output
from speed attack data. The X and Y axes represent the time and average value respectively. The
orange band is the rolling mean or unweighted moving average and the blue band represents the
exponential moving average trend. The window size is 20 time units for both. The value of α is
calculated from the window size using the equation 7.3.
The peaks correspond to the injected value in both the cases. They correctly depict the trend
in which the packets are injected. The packets were uniformly injected during the RPM attack.
But in the case of speed injection, we waited till the car achieved a minimum speed. Hence there
is a cluster of spikes after a small time period.
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Also, a slight lag is observed between the peaks of exponential moving average and simple
moving average. This lag in simple moving average could be due to the absence of weights. The
exponential moving average assigns higher weights to the recent values thus reducing the lag factor.
Overall, this method is successful in detecting the trends in which the packets were injected.
The results of time series analysis gives us the trends in the change of a parameter value. While
driving a vehicle, the speed or RPM are never constant. They change gradually in a continuous
fashion. But in an attack scenario, the speed or rpm change abruptly in discrete intervals. This
method smoothens the gradual changes. Hence time series analysis helps us to differentiate between
small gradients in speed and RPM and an attack scenario. Also, the computational complexity of
this method is low and it can be used as a technique to alert the driver of the vehicle in case of
an attack. But there might be a lag in predictions, which needs to be improved by adjusting the
weighting factors.
6.2 Impacts of the Results
The goal of this project is to detect injection attacks on in-vehicle network. We tried to solve
the problem of detecting the abnormal states into a data analytics problem. All these data analysis
techniques are compatible with older and newer vehicles unlike the other detection methods. These
techniques not only safeguard the vehicle from injection attacks, but also can be employed to
analyze the driving patterns of the driver and assist the driver.
The data analytics methods demonstrate that all these algorithms are successful in detecting
anomalous behavior at various levels of accuracy. There is always scope of improvement in terms
of the accuracy of detection. These techniques can be implemented in combination to achieve
better accuracy and reliability. Our approach is not limited to the techniques discussed here. It
can be extended to various other data analysis techniques like Hidden Markov and Support Vector
Machines or Hidden Markov PCA etc.
The absence of an anomaly detection mechanisms in the current in-vehicle network poses a
threat to passenger safety. It also majorly impacts the automotive industry in general. Various
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cars were hacked which demonstrated the severity of these security flaws. In such cases, the
manufacturers not only damage their brand image but also have to pay hefty amounts in terms of
collateral damage and legal formalities. The current technology does not support easy over-the-air
updates. The Chrysler attack [12] prompted Fiat Chrysler to send USB sticks with security patches
to 1.4 million car owners. Yet, the manufacturer cannot ensure that the patch has been installed
on every Fiat Chrysler.
The absence of these security features has a major impact on autonomous vehicles. Recently,
[13] a team hacked Tesla model X and Tesla model S. They disabled the breaks by accessing
the CAN network wirelessly through the infotainment system. Human drivers have the ability to
mitigate the damage by manually overriding in case of an attack. But the current autonomous
vehicles cannot act on the fly. Although the manufacturers regularly release security updates, the
security features need to keep up with with the advancing technology.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis presented the problem of injection attacks on automotive networks. We first looked
at the various attacks performed by researchers. We also studied the automobile architecture, CAN
bus architecture. Most importantly, we studied the loopholes in the CAN bus architecture which
provides room for attacks. We demonstrated injection attacks on our target vehicle (Ford Transit)
by injecting malicious speed and RPM data packets. The injection attack could manipulate the
tachometer and speedometer readings even when the vehicle is in motion. This attack demonstrates
how easily an attacker can access the CAN data. The anomaly detection approach based on several
data analysis techniques was tested and the experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of
the approach. The techniques are simple to implement and should be incorporated into the existing
intrusion detection systems easily.
The scope of this thesis limited our attack surfaces to OBD-II port. Similar injection attacks
can be replicated through various other attack surfaces like Bluetooth, Infotainment systems, Wi-fi,
Cellular networks, and even Key fobs. The attacks can also be targeted on several other critical
systems like gas pedal, breaks, automatic cruise control and gear rods. It will also be interesting
to replicate these attacks on autonomous vehicles to investigate the effectiveness of their security
features. This project considered a single attack happening at any given point of time. But it is
possible to launch attacks on multiple safety critical systems concurrently. To prototype a system
which can detect injection attacks in real time, the data analytics should be optimized to detect
multiple simultaneous attacks. It is also important to minimize the computational complexity.
Although it is impossible to track and detect every security threat an automobile faces, the security
features must keep up with the advancements in automotive technology.
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